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ARTICLES
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM: EXPLORING SOME CONNECTIONS
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON*
The anticipation of the Supreme Court's 1997 rulings on the
constitutionality of assisted suicide provoked an interesting debate among
feminist legal theorists. Based largely on references to self-determination
both in these cases and in litigation challenging abortion restrictions, some
feminists contended that continued protection of reproductive autonomy
requires recognizing a right to assisted suicide.' Other scholars, citing danger
to feminist objectives, rejected arguments linking reproductive freedom and a
"right to die."
2
The connections between these issues are sure to be explored anew now
that the Supreme Court has decided Washington v. Glucksberg3 and Vacco v.
Quill,4 rejecting both due process and equal protection challenges to assisted
suicide bans while purporting to leave undisturbed existing abortion
precedents.5 This Essay takes a brief look at three particular connections
between the assisted-suicide cases and reproductive freedom.
Part I examines the two-part test for substantive due process protection
* Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., Vassar College, 1977; J.D., University of
California-Berkeley, 1973. Thanks to law students Traci Fant, Kelly Koenig, Tina Riley, and Mandee
Rosier, who provided assistance on this Essay while working on a variety of other projects for me or
under my supervision. I also appreciate comments (some on much earlier incarnations of parts of this
Essay) from Professors Rebecca S. Dresser, Barbara J. Flagg, Katherine Goldwasser, William C.
Jones, Sanford H. Kadish, Daniel L. Keating, D. Bruce LaPierre, Ronald J. Mann, and Ronald M.
Levin.
1. See, e.g., Brief for the National Women's Health Network and Northwest Women's Law
Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-
1858), available in 1996 WL 709341; Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). See also,
e.g., Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Abortion, and Treatment Refusal:
Using Gender to Analyze the Difference, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 167 (Robert F. Weir ed.,
1997).
3. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
4. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
5. For example, the Minnesota Law Review has scheduled a symposium on Glucksberg and
Quill, based on a panel discussion of these cases at the 1998 Annunal Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools. Participants include Professors Sylvia A. Law, author of the brief cited supra
note 1, and Susan M. Wolf, author of the essay cited supra note 2. See Physician-Assisted Suicide:
After Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg, AALS LAW, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE
SECTION ANNUAL NEWSLETER (AALS, Washington D.C.) Dec. 1997, at 1.
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articulated in Glucksberg and raises questions about what this test might
mean for the future of reproductive freedom. Part II, which considers Quill's
reinforcement of the traditional distinction between omissions and actions,
reviews the feminist critique of the omission-duty principle. This Part also
shows how variable understandings of "omission" and "action" have allowed
the Court both (a) to constrict abortion rights in the abortion-funding cases
and their aftermath and (b) to overlook a persuasive argument for abortion
freedom, the samaritan argument Part HI explores Glucksberg's conclusion
that the debate on assisted suicide should continue, emphasizing the possible
consequences for reproductive autonomy of the Court's implicit suggestion
that Congress might ultimately resolve this debate. Throughout, this Essay
reveals how the Court's analysis in Glucksberg and Quill overlooks-not
necessarily inadvertently-important implications for reproductive rights.
I. RESHAPING "PRIVACY"
Under one feminist position expressed while awaiting the Supreme
Court's decisions, the future of constitutional "privacy" was at stake in
Glucksberg. Certainly the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. Washington6 (later captioned
Glucksberg) lent strength to this position, for the Ninth Circuit squarely
rested its recognition of a limited right to assisted suicide on Supreme Court
precedents according constitutional protection to reproductive autonomy. In
particular, the Ninth Circuit relied substantially on Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,7 the Court's last major word on
reproductive freedom.8 Casey, decided in 1992, promised some continued
measure of abortion choice in the face of calls to overrule Roe v. Wade.9 Yet,
right away, it was clear from the division on the Court in Casey,t" the
6. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. See 79 F.3d at 813-14 (relying on Casey, stating that "Like the decision of whether or not
have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy."').
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
10. Five Justices voted to accord some constitutional protection to abortion choice. Three of
these, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, wrote ajoint opinion adopting an "undue burden" test,
under which state-required information and waiting periods for abortion patients survive constitutional
scrutiny, but a spousal-notification requirement does not. The other two of these five, Justices Stevens
and Blackmun, would have adhered to the strict scrutiny and trimester timetable announced in Roe,
tests that the challenged legislation could not have survived. The four remaining Justices, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, would have overruled Roe and upheld all the
challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute under the rational-basis test.
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indeterminacy of the joint opinion's "undue burden" test,11 and the
subsequent changes in the Court's composition 2 that the Court's next word
on "privacy" or substantive due process13 would prove critically important
well beyond the immediate context in which such issues might arise. The
Ninth Circuit's opinion and the Supreme Court's decision to review
Glucksberg indicated that assisted suicide would provide the next
opportunity for the Court to elaborate and refine its understanding of privacy
and liberty. From this point of view, then, whatever the Supreme Court might
decide in Glucksberg would have a powerful influence on subsequent
litigation about other matters of self-determination of particular interest to
feminists, including abortion, contraception, and even assisted conception.
14
Other feminists, however, saw a bright line distinguishing assisted suicide
from matters of reproductive autonomy. Restrictions on abortion and
contraception implicate gender equality, as the Court acknowledged (albeit
belatedly) in Casey.15 This is not so for bans on assisted suicide, which affect
11. The joint opinion's definition of the standard is difficult to grasp: "[A]n undue burden is a
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
Particularly pointed criticism of this standard appears in some of the other opinions in Casey. See id. at
964-65 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that this
standard has no basis in constitutional law, will prove difficult to apply, and is "not built to last"); id.
at 985-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the test is
"standardless" and "rootless" and it appears to mean only "that a State may not regulate abortion in
such a way as to reduce significantly its incidence"). For commentary examining the standard, see
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,32-34 (1992).
12. After Casey, Justice Ginsburg replaced Justice White and Justice Breyer replaced Justice
Blackmun.
13. Roe found that the "right to privacy" protects the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy
and located this right in the protection of liberty conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Casey eschewed the language of "privacy" in favor of that
of "liberty," acknowledging that the Due Process Clause "has been understood to contain a substantive
component... 'barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them."' Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)). See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-51, 857.
14. See, e.g., Brief for National Women's Health Network, supra note 1. This brief contends,
inter alia, (a) that declining to recognize protection for assisted suicide, based on "a wooden historical
approach to constitutional jurisprudence . . . is particularly threatening to women," and (b) that
allowing a state to override autonomy on the basis of interests in protecting the vulnerable and
promoting respect for life reflects an approach "historically . . . utilized in ways that have been
particularly damaging to women." Id., 1996 WL 709341, at *4, *10. For the argument that
reproductive autonomy is an expansive right that includes the freedom to resort to modem responses to
infertility, including collaborative conception and "high-tech" medical procedures, see JOHN A.
ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
15. Commentators had noted how Roe's privacy analysis overlooked the manner in which
abortion restrictions undermine gender equality. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). The Court began to emphasize
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men and women alike.' 6 This distinction arguably would allow the Court to
uphold prohibitions on assisted suicide without threatening the constitutional
status of reproductive freedom.17 This approach, if taken in Glucksberg,
would strengthen gender equality as a constitutional value by making it, in
hindsight, the determinative element in the abortion and contraception cases.
Some feminists pushed the gender-equality point still further, contending
that recognition of a right to assisted suicide would pose real danger to
women. They argued that the vulnerability of women and their readiness for
self-sacrifice would turn any such right into a tool for the ultimate oppression
of women. '
8
In deciding Glucksberg, the Court adopted neither of these positions. The
approach used, however, offers ample grounds for feminists to debate the
implications.
A first reading of the the majority opinion in Glucksberg might find the
constitutional status of reproductive autonomy no weaker than it was before.
The Court explicitly reaffirms Casey, distinguishing constitutional protection
for the right to abortion from that sought for assisted suicide.19 In making this
distinction, the Court identifies two key requirements for substantive due
process protection: First, the asserted fundamental right must be "objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition... ,,,20 Second,
the woman's role in Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986). But Casey stands out as the first case in which the Court acknowledges the
importance of abortion rights for gender equality. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (holding that "[t]he
ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."); id. at 928 (opinion of Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "[a] State's restrictions on a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality.").
16. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(observing that "[e]very one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family member's
terminal illness.").
17. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey,
and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 803, 849-50 (1995); Marc Spindelman, Are the Similarities
Between a Woman's Right to Choose an Abortion and the Alleged Right to Assisted Suicide Really
Compelling?, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 775, 821-26 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106
YALE L.L 1123, 1161 (1997); Wolf, supra note 2, at 177-78. See also Brief of the Center for
Reproductive Law & Policy as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
18. See Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia, in FEMINISM & BIOETHIcs: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 282 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996). See
also Jocelyn Downie & Susan Sherwin, A Feminist Exploration of issues Around Assisted Death, 15
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 303, 322, 326 (1996) (raising such concerns, while supporting permissive
policy of assisted death based on respect for autonomy).
19. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (listing constitutionally protected liberties, including
abortion).
20. Id. at 2268 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
[VCOL. 76:15
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"substantive-due-process cases [require] a 'careful description' of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest."21 The Court finds assisted suicide fails
the first test, given that "[tihe history of the law's treatment of assisted
suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of
nearly all efforts to permit it."'22 And unlike abortion, which also concerns an
intimate and personal question of self-determination, the right claimed in
Glucksberg defies precise description. The Court quotes various formulations
advanced by proponents, including "'a liberty interest in determining the
time and manner of one's death,' 23 "a 'liberty to choose how to die,"' 24 "a
right to 'control of one's final days,"' 25 "'the right to choose a humane,
dignified death,"' 26 and 'the liberty to shape death."'27
A closer look at the majority's analysis, however, raises questions about
whether a constitutional right to abortion truly escapes unscathed. Critics of
constitutional protection for abortion might easily seize on Glucksberg to
point out the vulnerabilities it creates.28 The very formulation that allows the
right to abortion to meet Glucksberg's "precision" requirement arguably
poses difficulties when subjecting abortion to Glucksberg's requirement of
"objective history. ' 29 True, Roe v. Wade makes a persuasive case for the
significant abortion freedom women enjoyed in ancient times and at commonaw30 et if the rlev ttieswhnteFuenh
law; yet, i revant time is when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, then the case for protection within this Nation's history, viewed
objectively, becomes problematic.31 On the other hand, situating abortion in
21. Id. (quoting, inter alia, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
22. Id. at 2271. See also id at 2269.
23. Id. at 2269.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Roe v. Wade and the Euthanasia Debate,
12 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 343 (1997). See also, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the United States Catholic
Conference in Support of Petitioner State of Washington, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) (No. 96-110), available in 1996 WL 650919 (contending that the "Court's historical account in
Roe is seriously flawed"). Id., 1996 WL 650919, at *11.
29. I am indebted to Mandee Rosier for this observation.
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-41 (1973).
31. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe asserts that in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, "there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion." Id. at
175. For historical accounts of the development of American abortion prohibitions in the nineteenth
century, see KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 20-29 (1984); JAMES C.
MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900
(1978); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Abortion Movement and the AMA, 1850-1880, in CARROLL
SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 217
(1985).
In Casey, the Court explicitly rejected 1868 as the reference point: "Neither the Bill of Rights nor
19981
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more expansive protection that includes bodily integrity, family autonomy,
and freedom of conscience offers considerable support from this country's
history and tradition.32 But that formulation would then fail the "precision"
test for the same reasons the Court cites in rejecting constitutional protection
for assisted suicide. Indeed, some of the Justices themselves have observed in
the past that requiring an asserted interest to be articulated narrowly and
carefully, while still insisting on tracing its roots to this country's history and
traditions, might well spell the end of constitutional protection for a variety
of liberties we expect to be safeguarded, including use of and access to
contraception, freedom from race-based restrictions on marriage, and the
rights of unmarried fathers.33 No doubt the two-part test announced in
Glucksberg would create significant obstacles for an expansive constitutional
right to reproductive choice that includes protection for access to assisted
conception and other "high-tech" procedures.34
Certainly the Court had other avenues it might have followed to reach
Glucksberg's result. For example, the Justices might have adopted the second
feminist perspective outlined above, distinguishing abortion from assisted
suicide on the basis of the gender issues raised only by the former. This
approach would have rejected constitutional protection for assisted suicide,
while preserving it for abortion (and other freedoms implicating gender
equality, such as contraception).
Alternatively, the Glucksberg majority might have followed Justice
Souter's concurrence,35 which relies on Justice Harlan's famous dissent in
Poe v. Ullman.36 This analysis, on which the Court placed substantial
reliance in its encomium to abortion freedom in Casey,37 employs "a concept
of 'ordered liberty,' . . . comprising a continuum of rights to be free from
'arbitary impositions and purposeless restraints'... .,38 This approach, which
emphasizes the traditional values that due process protects, requires judicial
review of the substance of legislation for reasonableness "without . ..
the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the
outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." Planned
Parenthood of Southeastem Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
32. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-50.
33. See id. at 847-48. See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, joined by Kennedy, J.).
34. For an argument in favor of a broad right to reproductive autonomy, see ROBERTSON, supra
note 14.
35. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275-93 (1997).
36. 367 U.S. 497,522,539-55 (1961).
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-53.
38. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2281-82 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 549, 543
(Harlan, ., dissenting)).
[VOL. 76:15
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equating reasonableness with past practice described at a very specific
level."39 In other words, the analysis looks to history for broad principles, not
discrete rights. According to Justice Souter, the Constitution invalidates
legislation for violating substantive due process only when two conditions
are met. First, the individual liberty interest asserted must be "sufficiently
important to be judged 'fundamental, ' 'Ao and second, "the legislation's
justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with
the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied...."41 This
formulation, as Souter spells out, safeguards individual interests in
reproductive autonomy without extending similar protection for assisted
suicide, because in the latter context the state's interests "are sufficiently
serious to defeat the present claim that its law is arbitrary or purposeless.
'42
II. OMISSIONS AND ACTIONS
Glucksberg's companion case, Quill, centers on a different issue of
special interest in feminist legal theory-the legal consequences of the
traditional distinction between omissions and actions. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that New York's ban on assisted suicide violates
the Equal Protection Clause because the ban irrationally distinguishes
between two classes of the terminally ill: those who can get help hastening
death through the permissible removal of life support versus those requiring
prohibited active assistance to achieve the same goal, for example, the
prescription of drugs.43 In reversing the Second Circuit's decision, the
Supreme Court invokes causation, intent, and the distinction between killing
and letting die to reinforce the law's different treatment of actions and
omissions.
44
39. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2281 (Souter, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 2282 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
41. ldat2283.
42. Id. at 2290. Justice Souter concludes by cautioning: "While I do not decide for all time that
respondents' claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as
the better one to deal with that claim at this time." Id. at 2293.
43. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
44. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298-2301 (1997). The Court does not use the terms
"actions" and "omissions" but clearly follows this traditional dichotomy, invoking "fundamental legal
principles of causation and intent," id. at 2298, as well as the Court's own recognition of the difference
"between letting a patient die and making that patient die." Id. at 2301.
Several of the briefs filed in Glucksberg and Quill had urged the Court to abandon the traditional
action-omission distinction or to find it irrational, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had. See,
e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of State Legislators in Support of Respondents, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858), and Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (No. 96-110) (from
patient's perspective, interests do not differ); Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (No. 96-110), and Vacco v.
1998]
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The action-omission distinction has an important corollary, the omission-
duty rule or "Bad Samaritan" principle.45 This principle, a perennial target of
first-year law students and more established legal scholars alike,46 provides
that inaction triggers liability only when the inaction occurs in breach of a
legal duty. Because such legal duties are few and far between, this principle
means that in many situations one can walk away from a person in need of
help without incurring liability even if, as a result, the person in need dies. In
the face of widespread criticism of the rule,47 its often cited justifications
include "notions of individual freedom and autonomy that pervade our
society[;] '48 support for a laissez-faire role for government under which it "is
inappropriate for the law to require one person to act solely for the benefit of
another[;] '49 criminal law's special role of curbing official power to protect
individual rights and liberties;50 the goal of having legal rules that promote
efficiency;51 as well as concerns about priorities,52 vagueness, 53 line-
drawing,54 and the risk of"overreaction."
55
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) (arguing distinction between killing and letting die "is
based on a misunderstanding of the pertinent moral principles"). See also Alan Meisel, Physician-
Assisted Suicide: A Common Lmv Roadmap for State Courts, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 825.45
(1997) (criticizing purported distinction and demonstrating why causation and intent do not support
distinction).
45. See Anthony D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan"Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 798 (1975).
46. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673
(1994); Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REv. 547 (1988);
Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to
Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. I (1993).
47. This generalization does not mean that the rule lacks any supporters. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein,A Theory ofStrict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-204 (1973).
48. Leavens, supra note 46, at 577. See John Kleinig, Criminal Liability for Failures to Act, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 170 (1986); Yeager, supra note 46.
49. Heyman, supra note 46, at 676.
50. See Meir Dan Cohen, Actus Reus, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 15, 20
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
51. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study ofLaw andAltruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 119-27 (1978).
52. That is, government should concentrate its limited resources on those who pose affirmative
dangers. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
181-97 (6th ed. 1995) (so suggesting). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 83 (1991)
(quoting PROSSER & KEETON on similar rationale in tort law).
53. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 52, at 181-97 (so suggesting); Leavens, supra note
46, at 581 ("Commentators have objected that omissions cases inherently raise unique problems of
notice .. "). The need for a "clearly ascertainable event" triggering liability is less likely to be
satisfied by an omission than an acL See Cohen, supra note 50, at 20.
54. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 52, at 181-97 (so suggesting). See Epstein, supra
note 47, at 198 (it would be "very hard to set out in a principled manner the limits of social
interference with individual liberty.").
55. Yeager, supra note 46, at 38-39 (citing the possibility of victims overwhelmed by the aid of
hundreds of rescuers all obliged to act by the criminal law).
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Under the omission-duty rule, a stranger can leave a baby to drown in a
shallow pool,56 an adult child can leave an incapacitated parent to die in
squalor in a nearby bedroom, 57 and one who invites a family to stay at her
home can stand by and watch the parent beat the child to death,58 all without
incurring liability, given the absence of a legal duty to aid in each case. First-
year law students resist the omission-duty principle's acceptance of these
intuitively offensive and immoral outcomes, as I see each year when I teach
criminal law. Among the principle's numerous other critics, feminist scholars
cite this rule as evidence of mainstream jurisprudence's emphasis on
individuality and autonomy at the expense of caring and connection-values
much more familiar to women and more consistent with women's way of
looking at the world.59 If our legal rules had developed based on a female
norm, goes the argument, then we well might be expected routinely to act to
aid others, either through the recognition of a more comprehensive list of
legal duties or through abandonment of the duty requirement altogether.60
Certainly, a jurisprudence based on caring and connection would not permit
the outcomes in the three situations described above.61
Feminists have another reason to question the omission-duty principle. Its
foundation, the distinction between actions and omissions, has no consistent
boundaries. 62 And the malleability of precisely what constitutes an omission
for purposes of the rule has, in a few notable examples, yielded results
decidedly unfriendly to reproductive rights. In other words, this critique does
not contend that Quill should have treated suicide assistance as an omission;
rather, it questions the coherence of the distinction underlying the Court's
analysis.63
56. This is the paradigm case. See, e.g., KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 52, at 196 (this
scenario describes "the classic omission case where, under common law doctrine, there is no duty and
hence no liability.").
57. See People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229 (Cal. 1994). See also Mary Bruno et al., Abusing the
Elderly, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 75.
58. See Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1979).
59. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18, 58 (1988). See
also GLENDON, supra note 52, at 77 (finding unexpressed premise in American law, specifically
treatment of omissions, that "we roam at large in a land of strangers, where we presumptively have no
obligations toward others except to avoid the active infliction of harm."); Ann C. Scales, Surviving
Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REv. 139, 143 (1990) (critiquing old torts cases
rejecting liability for failure to rescue injured child, despite moral duty to act).
60. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 3,
33-36 (1988).
61. See supra text at notes 56-58.
62. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271
(1990).
63. The Court itself recognizes the difficulty in maintaining the distinction when acknowledging
the practice of "terminal sedation," a form of aggressive palliative care known to cause death, despite
1998]
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A. The Abortion-Funding Cases
Consider first the abortion-funding cases.64 In these cases, the Supreme
Court relied on the concept of state inaction or omission to distinguish the
criminal restrictions on abortion invalidated in Roe v. Wade from selective
funding schemes. Under these funding programs, the government subsidizes
continued pregnancy and childbirth for indigent women but refuses such
assistance for their abortions. In upholding such programs, the Court
explained that the failure to subsidize even medically necessary abortions
does not "impinge" on the constitutionally protected right recognized in Roe
because this essentially negative right65 confers no "entitlement" to public
support for its exercise. 66 The Court made plain its understanding of the
government's role as one of inaction by emphasizing that the challengers
were no worse off than if the government provided no medical assistance at
all67 and by contrasting the passivity of the nonsubsides with the active
intrusion on constitutional rights that occurs when the state imposes
obstacles,68  7enalties,69  restrictions, 7°  and "unduly burdensome"
interferences.7 In announcing the two-track system for such state omissions
and actions, the Court said that the rational basis test governs "passive" anti-
abortion laws, rather than the strict judicial scrutiny that Roe required for
"active" limitations.72
the prohibition of assisted suicide. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 n.1 1 (1997). See also
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 295-99 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(questioning distinction between refusing life-sustaining treatment and suicide).
64. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding federal Hyde Amendment, which
provides no assistance for medically necessary abortions for indigent women, despite funding for
prenatal care and childbirth for such women); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (upholding
similar state measure); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of state's
refusal to pay for elective abortions while paying for childbirth services). See also Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding "gag rule," which withheld government financial support from family
planning clinics that provide abortion counseling).
65. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of
the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 721,735 (1981).
66. See, e.g., McRae, 448 U.S. at 316, 318.
67. See id. at 314, 317; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. Scholars have questioned the Court's choice of
the absence of all medical care as the "baseline" for analysis. See, e.g., Bandes, supra 62, at 2343-44;
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 1293, 1359-74 (1984) (alternative baselines); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1440 (1989).
68. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
69. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8.
70. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 314; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
71. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 314; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
72. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17, 324; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474, 478. See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
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The Court's analysis, however, reveals several salient departures from the
classic omission framework and its underpinnings, indicating just how far the
traditional approach had to be stretched to fit the facts of the abortion-
funding cases. First, the traditional approach was always careful to
distinguish "pure inaction" from situations in which the "inactor" had begun
to aid or had undertaken action in conjunction with the omission in question.
Indeed, one of the legal duties commonly listed among the omission-duty
principle's exceptions includes the obligation to continue providing
assistance by one who has started to help.73 In setting forth the omission-duty
rule, the Model Penal Code's provision on omissions explicitly speaks of an
"omission unaccompanied by action."74 The abortion-funding cases do not fit
this paradigm because in order to view the selective funding schemes as
inaction, the Court had to sever the link between the nonfunding of abortions
and the subsidizing of childbirth, not to mention the provision of all other
necessary medical care by the state.75
Thus, in contrast to the proposal of some critics to abandon the traditional
omission-duty principle by considering each would-be omission in the
context of what the "inactor" did over a longer period of time,76 in the
abortion-funding cases the Court examined only the narrowest slice of the
government's conduct at the moment of alleged constitutional violation.77
But the Court did not stop with its narrow look at nonsubsidies as inaction,
for after ignoring contemporaneous aspects of the same government
program, in particular the support for childbirth, the Court later made such
73. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3(4), at 205.06
(2d ed. 1986). See also Epstein, supra note 47, at 194 (describing, but rejecting, this rule in tort law).
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (1985).
75. See Appleton, supra note 65, at 738-40.
76. See Leavens, supra note 46, at 583-84.
77. The Court used essentially the same approach several years later in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). DeShaney characterized the conduct of
the state as inaction after the state investigated a family because of reports of child abuse, returned
custody of young Joshua to the father, and then failed to prevent the father from inflicting severely
debilitating injuries on his son. See id. at 196. Relying on the abortion-funding cases, the majority held
that due process does not compel affirmative acts of child protection by the state. See id. (citing Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)). See GLENDON, supra note 52, at 92-98 (explaining the
Court's analysis). But see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991) (contending that the DeShaney Court misread
history to reach incorrect conclusion that original understanding of Fourteenth Amendment does not
include positive right to protection). Certainly, only the most limited and out-of-context look at the
state's behavior would see inaction subject to the traditional omission-duty rule. See DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 204-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that state had acted); Bandes, supra note 62, at
2289-90 (line between action and inaction blurs in context of pervasive regulation of child-protective
services); Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old GUfhorse, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 247, 262 (1990) ("Mhe county's relationship to [the victim] cannot accurately be described as
'inaction'....").
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action relevant. In ultimately finding the selective funding rational, the Court
considered the two parts of the program together as forming a reasonable
means of "encouraging childbirth" and expressing official pro-childbirth
value judgments.78
One also can see the distortion of the ordinary understanding of
"omission" in these cases by examining the misfit between the abortion-
funding scenario and the traditional justifications for the omission-duty
principle. One such justification claims the principle protects individual
autonomy and curbs government intrusion.79 But this laissez-faire rationale
gets turned on its head in the abortion-funding cases, in which the "inactor"
protected by the rule is the government itself,80 while individuals asserting
claims of autonomy and privacy (and not far-fetched claims, given Roe81)
find the principle defeats their liberty. Indeed, the Court has used the
omission-duty principle to signal approval of dramatically increased
government involvement in the personal lives of individuals. In validating
the challenged laws as rational mechanisms for encouraging childbirth, the
Court authorized funding schemes purposely designed to influence one of the
most intimate choices, whether to terminate a pregnancy or carry it to term.
The laws upheld by the Court thus reflect a remarkable level of state
intrusion into individual decisionmaking.
82
78. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474, 478
(1977). Such official value judgments in favor of childbirth had appeared foreclosed by Roe, at least
before viability. See Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde
Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113 (1980).
79. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
80. It is ironic, then, that Heyman finds his strongest basis for a duty to rescue in public law,
invoking what the individual owes to the state as a starting point. See generally Heyman, supra note
46. But he also finds that the state has an obligation to meet the subsistence needs of its members. See
id. at 727-28, 738. Such subsistence needs must include necessary medical care, which would
presumably encompass therapeutic abortions. See also Bandes, supra note 62, at 2317 ("Even
accepting as a given that people should not be legally bound to help one another, the question remains
whether government should be legally bound to help its citizens.").
Some have argued that the holdings in the abortion-funding cases also protect individual taxpayers
who morally oppose abortion. See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions
and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1008-11, 1046-47 (1991). But see Laurence H. Tribe,
The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of
Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330,339-40 (1985).
81. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 78.
82. This legacy of the abortion-funding cases emerges today in welfare-reform plans expressly
constructed to discourage childbearing among the poor, so-called "family caps" and "child
exclusions." See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-
Invading Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-
Burden Test, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1996). These are not government "hands-off' plans, but rather
systematic and intricate measures developed by states and Congress to decrease illegitimate births and
teenage pregnancies by withholding support for any additional children born to a parent already
receiving welfare and denying assistance for children born to teens. See generally Susan Frelich
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Similarly, other concerns cited to justify the omission-duty principle, such
as those based on vagueness and priorities, have no role to play in explaining
the abortion-funding cases.83 In this situation, the same government that
subsidizes childbirth would have the affirmative duty to act, eliminating the
worry about how to select which of hundreds of "inactors" ought to be
required to help. 4 And, in terms of choosing priorities in the allocation of
scarce resources, the Court has acknowledged that subsidizing childbirth
costs far more than subsidizing abortion. 5
But the Court's manipulation of the action-omission distinction did not
stop here. In subsequent cases, the Court relied on the abortion-funding
opinions to uphold laws that in no plausible sense fit the notion of inaction or
omission, no matter how one slices the relevant time period or the
government program in question. Citing the absence of an "undue burden" in
the abortion-funding cases, the Court rejected challenges first to criminal
provisions prohibiting public employees from performing non-lifesaving
abortions86 and then to all active abortion restrictions that fall short of an
absolute prohibition or a requirement of third-party involvement in the
decision.8 In fact, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Appleton, When Welfare Reforms Promote Abortion: "Personal Responsibility, " "Family Values, "
and the Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155 (1996). Already, such plans have earned judicial approval
based on the abortion-funding cases' concept of inaction. Although those targeted by these laws have
the right to have (more) children, the government has no affirmative obligation to subsidize such
procreative choices. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1015 (D.N.J. 1995), affd sub nom. C.K. v.
New Jersey Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996).
83. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
84. This answer still leaves room for questions about the respective roles of federal and state
funds under the cooperative venture known as Medicaid, but such questions do not implicate hundreds
of"inactors."
Under current interpretations of the law, states have the authority to subsidize a larger class of
abortions than those supported by federal funds, but states cannot subsidize a smaller class without
jeopardizing their participation in the Medicaid program. Thus, if Congress currently provides funds
not just for life-saving abortions, but also for abortions in pregnancies caused by rape or incest, states
participating in Medicaid cannot make their funds available only for life-saving abortions. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Engler, 73 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 1996); Hem v. Beye, 57
F.3d 906, 911-12 (10th Cir. 1995). But cf. Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 116 S. Ct.
1063, 1064 (1996) (per curiam) (accepting, without deciding, this interpretation of Hyde Amendment).
85. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,468,478-79 (1977).
86. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989). The Court
acknowledged that these restrictions covered abortions even for patients who would pay, so the
question was not simply one of a "passive" state failure to subsidize. See id. at 511 (the abortion-
funding cases "support the view that the State need not commit any resources to facilitating abortions,
even if it can turn a profit by doing so."). See also Bandes, supra note 62, at 2297-308.
87. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992)
(upholding detailed informed-consent and waiting-period requirements because they do not impose an
undue burden). Although citing the abortion-funding cases as a source of this undue burden test, see id.
at 875, 876, the Justices writing the joint opinion made no effort to clothe their version of the test in
the language of "inaction" or "omission."
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Casey, the joint opinion announced that the undue burden test, originally
derived from the Court's analysis of the "passive" nonsubsidies in the
abortion-funding cases, would henceforth govern all pre-viability restrictions
on abortion, active and passive alike.
88
B. Samaritanism and Abortion Rights
While the abortion-funding cases and their aftermath show how the
notion of an omission has been stretched to limit reproductive freedom, there
is also evidence that the Court has used the concept narrowly even though a
broader reading might reinforce such freedom. Even before Roe v. Wade, one
line of attack against abortion restrictions explained that such restrictions
amount to an exceptional "Good Samaritan" requirement for pregnant
women. 9 This argument rests on the premise that, in effect, an abortion
constitutes an omission-a failure to provide assistance to the fetus. For its
proponents, one of the strengths of this argument is the irrelevance of the
legal status of the fetus: the omission-duty principle permits most inactions
even if they result in the death of another person.9° Yet, despite the enduring
appeal of this argument, which has been called the best argument for abortion
freedom,9' the Supreme Court has never explicitly invoked it to shore up the
much disputed constitutional protection found in privacy and liberty.92
Now it is true that an abortion does not look like an omission, given the
physician's active intervention as well as the patient's initial efforts to solicit
88. See id. at 876 ("In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of
reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty.").
89. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 47, 63 (1971).
See also Donald I-. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979) (post-Roe
elaboration of Thomson's analysis).
90. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Woman's Virtue, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1591, 1593 (1989) (Thomson's
approach provides the best argument for abortion freedom because it reveals the real question: whether
pregnant women may be compelled to provide aid without which the fetus will die).
91. Seeid.
92. Among the many attacks on Roe's analysis, see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by
Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159. Casey, however, does contain some
language that might suggest the samaritan approach: The Court's opinion noted that the values at stake
include "personal autonomy and bodily integrity," Casey, 505 U.S. at 857, and Justice Blackmun
wrote:
A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional
guarantees of gender equality.... By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State
conscripts women's bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer
the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care. The State does not
compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter of
course.
Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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such medical treatment. Yet Judith Jarvis Thomson's classic analogy makes
the case: just as our law would not require one to remain "plugged in" to an
ailing violinist even if that were the only way to save his life, so too the law
should not single out pregnant women as the only class of persons required
not just to summon aid for another, but also to provide the aid themselves
over a nine-month period at the expense of their own physical integrity and
quite possibly their health as well.93
If "pulling the plug" on the fetus--or the violinist-still seems not to
merit legal classification as an omission, then return to developments in the
"right to die" area. Over twenty years ago, Glanville Williams recommended
relying on 'the concept of omission" to justify "switching off [a modem]
respirator," based on the functional equivalence of such conduct and the
doctor's failure to continue turning a handle that operates an imaginary,
much more primitive respirator.94 In Barber v. Superior Court,95 the
California Court of Appeal followed Williams' analogy almost step-by-step
to conclude that "the cessation of 'heroic' life support measures is not an
affirmative act but rather... [an] omission of further treatment." 96 Later, the
United States Supreme Court implicitly adopted the same approach in its first
"right to die" case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,97 by
failing to differentiate between refusals to begin treatment and withdrawals
of treatment already begun.98 And in Quill, the Court goes further, indicating
93. See Thomson, supra note 89.
94. See Glanville Williams, Euthanasia, 41 MEDICo-LEGAL3. 14,21 (1973):
The proposition that switching off the respirator should be regarded as an omission may be proved
as follows. Suppose that the respirator worked only as long as the doctor turned a handle. Then, if
he stopped turning, he would thereafter be regarded merely as omitting. Suppose, alternatively,
that the respirator worked electrically but was made to shut itself off every 24 hours. Then the
deliberate failure to restart it would again be an omission. It can make no moral difference that the
respirator is constructed to run continuously and has to be stopped. Stopping the respirator is not a
positive act of killing the patient, but a decision not to strive any longer to save him.
95. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983).
96. Id. at 490.
97. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
98. In Cruzan, the Court "assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a competent
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition," id. at 279, and
then proceeded to analyze the extent to which an incompetent person has the same right. See id. The
facts in the case, however, centered on the withdrawal of treatment that had already begun, but the
Court's emphasis on refusal of treatment was broad enough to encompass both withdrawal and the
failure to begin treatment in the first place. See id.
There are important policy reasons why the law attaches the same consequences to (active)
withdrawals of artificial life support as it attaches to (passive) failures to begin such treatment in the
first place. If the law were to protect patient choice in the latter, but not in the former, patients or their
families might be afraid to begin such measures, given the uncertainty of full recovery. See id. at 314
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234 (N.J. 1985) (citing Lynn &
Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17, 19-20
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that terminations of artificial life support-actions "pulling the plug"--are a
means of "letting die" and suggesting that such actions are properly treated as
the law traditionally has treated omissions.
99
One can legitimately wonder why the Court has avoided the very same
reasoning in the abortion context Although many grounds remain for
questioning whether it makes sense to regard an abortion as an omission,100
the same questions must arise for terminations of artificial life support that
have already begun. °1' Like Glucksberg, Quill has interesting, and not
entirely reassuring, implications for abortion rights.
(1983)).
99. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1997) (treating as equivalent "a physician
who withdraws, or honors a patient's refusal to begin, life-sustaining medical treatment .... ). See also
id. at 2300 (noting similar approach by state legislatures). Quill's analysis thus perpetuates the action-
omission distinction, even while avoiding the traditional terminology. Cf supra note 63.
100. For example, considering abortion as a samaritan issue would have linked abortion to a
morally questionable rule. See Law, supra note 15, at 1022-23. Further, this approach would provide
no basis for guaranteeing abortions for poor women. See Regan, supra note 89, at 1644-45 (this
argument does not extend to assistance for abortions). Of course, the Court's right-to-privacy approach
also failed to guarantee abortions for poor women. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, because the samaritan argument for abortion freedom rests, at bottom, on an equal
protection foundation (pregnant women alone must serve as Good Samaritans), this approach might
well strengthen the case for requiring abortion funding when assistance is provided for virtually all
other medical care. See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 385. See also EILEEN L. McDONAGH, BREAKING
THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996) (arguing that the samaritan analogy
compels the state to subsidize abortions).
101. Readers unfamiliar with the writings of Thomson and Regan, supra note 89, will challenge
the samaritan approach to abortion on any number of counts. Yet each of these obvious difficulties is
acknowledged and addressed in a sufficiently thoughtful, if not an entirely unassailable, manner to
prevent outright dismissal of the approach.
For example, Regan concedes how hard it is to think of an abortion as an omission. Regan, supra
note 89, at 1574-75, 1578-79. Of course, the examination of the Barber case (supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text), decided well after the publication of Thomson's and Regan's articles, lends
support to the idea that "pulling the plug" constitutes an omission, regardless of context. Yet, the
removal of life support purportedly allows "nature to take its course," with the patient's death as a
likely result. When "nature takes its course" in a pregnancy, however, the pregnancy usually
continues, with childbirth as the likely result. On the other hand, the death following the removal of
life support typically results from asphyxiation, starvation, or dehydration. How does that differ from
an abortion, which also deprives the fetus of elements essential for survival? In the alternative, Regan
compares abortion to justified self-defense. See Regan, supra note 89, at 1611-18.
Thomson addresses a second obvious challenge, the woman's role in creating the pregnancy. See
Thomson, supra note 89, at 57-59. She discusses cases of rape and failed birth control to conclude that
at least in some situations abortion is not an unjust killing. See id. She leaves open the question of
precisely what situations ought to be covered by the argument. See id. Regan explains how the
woman's conduct leaves the fetus "no worse off," in an effort to address this problem. See Regan,
supra note 89, at 1598-603.
Regan responds to still another problem that critics typically cite, the special parent-child duty.
See id. at 1593-98. He points out, first, how parents have the option of relieving themselves of the
burdens of parenthood (say, by relinquishing the child for adoption) and, second, how the physical
burdens of pregnancy exceed significantly what the law requires under any recognized legal duty. See
id.
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III. CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE-BUT WHERE?
In rejecting the constitutional challenges in both Glucksberg and Quill,
the Court remits the question of assisted suicide to legislative resolution. At
the end of the majority opinion in Glucksberg, the Court observes that
"[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide."' 0 2 The Court then expresses hope that this debate will continue, as it
"should in a democratic society." 10 3
Although the Glucksberg majority does not say so, in the process that the
Court might imagine, each state will experiment with different approaches to
the difficult issue of assisted suicide. The concurring Justices explicitly
contemplate continuing experimentation within the fifty states, with Justice
Souter expressing hope that "such experimentation will be attempted in some
of the States"1 °4 and Justice O'Connor writing, as she did in Cruzan, that
'the... challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding
... liberty interests is entrusted to the "laboratory" of the States... in the
first instance."' 05 Some of the Justices have, in parallel fashion, expressly
urged state-by-state consideration of reproductive rights, should the Court
decide to overturn or limit the constitutional protection announced in Roe v.
Wade.
10 6
Yet, as a close reading of the opinion reveals, the Glucksberg majority in
fact says nothing explicitly about the states when it decides that assisted
suicide should remain a legislative question.10 7 Could the ambiguity in the
102. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring) ("There is, indeed, good reason to suppose that in the
absence of a judgment for repondents here, just such experimentation will be attempted in some of the
States [citing proposed state statutes in Brief for State Legislators as Amici Curiae].").
105. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, L, concurring) (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932)).
106. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A woman's interest in having an
abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion
procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest."); id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the
Constitution does not require them to do so."); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("The upshot [of Roe and Doe] is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are
constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and
development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on
the other hand.").
107. The majority simply writes: "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest
and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
1998]
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Court's language mean the Justices contemplated another possibility: federal
legislation?
Increasingly, Congress is enacting federal legislation that addresses
matters of family, health, and welfare-traditionally the prerogative of each
state. Congress has proceeded to exercise control over these areas in two
different ways. First, Congress has conditioned funds that it provides to the
states for particular programs on the states' compliance with federal
requirements. 0 8 Examples include many child-support laws that each state
must adopt in order to receive funds under such legislation as the Child
Support Enforcement Act of 1984,109 the Family Support Act of 1988,110 and
most recently the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996---"welfare reform.""' The resulting
federalization of family law significantly undercuts the traditional view that
the "whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United
States.","12 This approach reflects even more federal intervention than those
programs in which Congress purports simply to limit the purposes for which
states can use federal funds." 3 In the "conditional-funding" developments
cited here, by contrast, Congress is imposing affirmative requirements that
states must meet to remain eligible for particular federal funds, in effect,
2275. In Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), the majority upholds New York's legislative
classification without addressing the larger issues examined in Glucksberg.
108. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911
(1995); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1103 (1987).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (establishment of enforcement procedures).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)-(b) (1994) (by 1987, states must use child support guidelines as rebuttable
presumptions in Title IV-D cases, those in which the state seeks to recover from an absent parents
payments made to support a needy child).
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (West Supp. 1997) (each state must adopt Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act by January 1, 1998). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 also promises financial rewards for states that achieve certain federally specified
objectives. See, e.g., id. at § 403(a)(4) (bonuses for decreasing illegitimacy).
112. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689
(1992). Compare Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV.
1073 (1994), with Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995).
113. Essentially, Congress has used the same approach with the states that the government (both
state and federal) has used with individuals in the abortion-funding cases. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text. Under this approach, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress
subsidizes the programs it chooses to support but provides no funding for other programs. See Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) ("when the Govemment appropriates public funds to establish a
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program"). See also supra note 82. Congress has
begun to use the "abortion-funding approach" in the "right to die" arena, for example, enacting
measures that disallow the use of federal funds for suicide assistance, even if permitted by the states.
See Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 14401 et seq.), cited in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2266 (1997).
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controlling indirectly state prerogatives that it could not control directly.1 14
Second, Congress has invoked its power under the Commerce Clause to
legislate in areas that the states traditionally controlled. For example, in the
Child Support Recovery Act," 5 Congress has made the willful failure to pay
a past-due support obligation for a child who resides in another state a federal
crime. Most courts have upheld the statute against challenges that it exceeds
Congress' authority.116 According to these courts, payment (or nonpayment)
of a debt constitutes economic activity, and the difference in location of
obligor and obligee requires satisfaction of the debt by interstate means.117
The result is a valid federal family law, which requires federal courts to
address family-law problems typically outside federal authority.'18 Perhaps
the Glucksberg majority's silence about precisely which legislature(s) should
attempt to address assisted suicide signals the Court's openness to a federal
forum for the continuing debate and, ultimately, a federal resolution.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recognition in United States v.
Lopez 19 of the limits of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause,
120
114. See Baker, supra note 108, at 1916 & n. 16 (distinguishing "reimbursement spending" from
"regulatory spending"). See generally Rosenthal, supra note 108, at 1110, 1133-42.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
753 (1997); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1567
(1997); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 784 (1997). See
generally Jeanne M. Tanner, Comment, Constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act in the
Wake of United States v. Lopez, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 267 (1997).
117. But see United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 115 F.3d 1222
(5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 866 (1998).
118. See Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 729,730.
119. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (federal Gun Free School Zones Act exceeds Congress' authority under
the Commerce Clause). The Court determined that the conduct covered by the Act did not constitute
economic activity that, in aggregation with similar activity, could affect interstate commerce. See id. at
559-61. Further, Congress included in the statute no jurisdictional element that ensures an effect on
interstate commerce. See id. at 561-63.
120. Congress' authority to enact laws on assisted suicide might, in theory, also rest on section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to enforce the due process and equal
protection guarantees. A majority of the Justices expressly recognize that Fourteenth Amendment
interests are at stake in Glucksberg and Quill, even if those interests are not "fundamental" and the
state's countervailing interests should prevail in the instant challenges. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2290 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that liberty interests at stake
demand careful scrutiny but there is no need now to decide whether they are fundamental); see id. at
2303 (O'Connor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that there is no need to address
question whether competent, suffering person has constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling
circumstances of immiment death); see id. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "some
individuals who no longer have the option of deciding whether to live or to die because they are
already on the threshold of death have a constitutionally protected interest that may outweigh the
State's interest in preserving life at all costs"); id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that our
legal traditions may provide greater support for a specially protected liberty interest in "personal
control over the manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary
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it is not difficult to imagine a federal code of assisted suicide emerging from
Dr. Jack Kevorkian's ability to attract to Michigan "patients" from across the
United States, especially if he charges fees for his services!' 2'
To the extent the Court gives its implicit blessing to a federal legislative
resolution of the assisted suicide debate, it also suggests a similar direction
for the regulation of abortion and other matters of reproduction. In the federal
bills that would ban certain late-term abortions, Congress has based its
authority to legislate on the premise that abortion services constitute
interstate commerce.' 22 Certainly, if the Commerce Clause gives Congress
the authority to address not only violence at abortion clinics,'23 but also a
particular abortion procedure, then Congress can address as well all abortion
procedures and also can legislate matters such as abortion waiting periods,
and severe physical suffering-combined.").
Nonetheless, this foundation for federal legislation on assisted suicide (and, by analogy, some
reproductive matters) is vulnerable, given the limits on Congress' authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, as the Court recently has articulated these limits. In invalidating the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act for exceeding Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
majority of the Court stated that section 5 allows Congress to enact "measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions [,not] measures that make a sustantive change in the governing law... ." City
ofBoeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157, 2164 (1997). Based on what the Supreme Court already has said
about the constitutional status of assisted suicide (and abortion), some imaginable federal legislative
efforts might well exceed these limits. Cf. Human Life Bill, S. 158, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981)
(finding human life exists at conception and Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect all human
beings); Freedom of Choice Act, S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (codifying Roe v. Wade's strict
scrutiny for abortion restrictions). True, there are also limits on Congress' commerce power, as Lopez
recognizes. See supra note 119. Yet the requirements that the Court demands for the exercise this
authority would seem easily satisfied in the context of assisted suicide and reproductive health care.
See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Kevorkian Is Questfonedin Two More Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, § 1, at
14 (reporting deaths in Michigan of a man from Pennsylvania and a woman from Florida); Kevorkian
Deaths Total 100, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 1998, § 1, at 18. See also In re Christine Busalacchi, No.
59582, 1991 WL 10048 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1991) (enjoining father, who desires to remove
daughter's feeding tube, from moving her to a more permissive state); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate
Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873 (1993);
Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and
Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992). Even if these
"patients" do not always pay the doctor, their use of hotel, hospital, and morgue services should
provide sufficient economic activity. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964).
122. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, S. 6, 105th Cong., 1st Sass. (1997).
123. See The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). The federal
courts of appeals have upheld the statute as a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power, even after
Lopez. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 47
(1996); Cheffner v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995). See also American Life League, Inc. v.
Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809 (1995) (pre-Lopez case, with post-Lopez
denial of certiorari). See generally Amy H. Nemko, Case Note, Saving FACE: Clinic Access Under a
New Commerce Clause, 106 YALE L.. 525 (1996); Benjamin W. Roberson, Note, Abortion as
Commerce: The Impact oftUnited States v. Lopez on the Freedom ofAccess to Clinic Entrances Act of
1994,50 VAND. L. REV. 239,258-59 (1997).
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mandated preabortion information, parental-consent and notification rules,
and similar requirements.' 24 Under this reasoning, federal authority would
also reach other reproductive services, such as assisted conception. 125 A
federal code of human reproduction might plausibly result from this
Commerce-Clause approach. 2 6 The emergence of RU-486, the French
"abortion pill," reinforces the growing federalization of the substantive law
of reproduction, with the Food and Drug Administration controlling the
medication's availability for use 2 7 and hence determining the permissibility
of nonsurgical abortions.
Federal abortion laws might be more restrictive or more permissive than
their state counterparts. And, of course, the constitutional limits on how far
government can intrude in such protected choices, articulated in Roe and
Casey, constrain federal and state legislatures alike.'2 8 Further, the prospect
of conflicting or overlapping laws raises a host of questions about
preemption, supremacy, and federalism. For example, once federal
authorities give final approval for doctors to prescribe RU-486, can states
prohibit the medication's use 129 for the purpose of advancing state interests
124. There is evidence that state measures of this sort induce women to seek abortions in more
permissive states. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST
OF CHILDREN 149, 242 (1985) (decrease in abortions in states with parental involvement requirements
may result from minors' traveling to other states to avoid requirements). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (holding unconstitutional Georgia's residency requirement for abortions).
125. Many proposals are pending in Congress to prohibit human cloning. See, e.g., Human
Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). The Senate voted down one such
measure, but not on grounds that it would exceed Congress' authority. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate, 54-
42, Rejects Republican Bill to Ban Human Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al8. Other bills
would simply prohibit the use of federal funds for human cloning research. See, e.g., S. 368, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
In addition, federal law now requires assisted reproductive technologies programs to report their
pregnancy rates to the Department of Health and Human Services for annual publication and
distribution to the public. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 - 263a-7 (1994).
126. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeaster Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (condemning Court's imposition of "a rigid
national [abortion] rule instead of allowing for regional differences"). This development would not be
something new: Recall the early restrictions on abortion and contraception in the federal Comstock
Law. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 176, 187 (1985).
127. In 1996, the FDA conditionally approved RU-486 as safe and effective. See Gina Kolata, Pill
for Abortion Clears Big Hurdle to its Sale in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al.
128. For example, the standards that federal courts have invoked to strike down state bans on late-
term abortions would also apply to a federal ban, should one ever become law. See, e.g., Women's
Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1785
(U.S. 1998); Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp.
1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
129. This is the mirror-image of the struggle between Oregon and federal authorities over the
permissibility of physician-assisted suicide: Already, Oregon voters' decision to permit assisted
suicide has raised the question whether federal authorities can prohibit conduct that the state permits.
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that the Court previously deemed legitimate reasons for restricting
abortion? 30 But apart from these jurisprudential considerations, relocating
the "dialogue" on abortion restrictions and other reproductive choices from
state legislatures to Congress is sure to affect both the politics surrounding
these difficult topics and the resulting law.
The Glucksberg majority's silence about the appropriate forum for
continued dialogue on assisted suicide arguably signals that the Court is
prepared to accept a national legislative standard to resolve this divisive
issue. Feminists and other strategists for reproductive freedom should heed
this silence, while preparing to fight their battles not just in state legislatures,
but in Congress as well.
See, e.g., Justice Dept. Bars Punishing Oregon Doctors Aiding Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, at
A7. By contrast, the question raised in text hypothesizes a state effort to restrict what federal
authorities permit. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), could have presented a scenario
for a similar question (state law prohibits use of drugs and devices that have federal approval).
130. Casey recognizes the woman's health and fetal protection as legitimate state interests that
support pre-viability abortion restrictions, so long as those restrictions fall short of undue burdens. See
505 U.S. at 870-78.
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